2.0 KiB
2.0 KiB
Phase 7K – Signed-update reality
Direct answer
No legitimate local method currently exists to produce an APK, OTA payload or AVB image that this locked television will accept. Public certificates were found; the private keys and OEM signing service were not. Public X.509 data cannot generate signatures.
| Option | What it would provide | Feasibility | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| A. Official Philips/TPVision build and signing process | coherent source build, Platform-signed APK, possibly OTA/AVB integration | technically ideal; no access yet | BEST / REQUEST |
| B. Manufacturer ships its own patched update | OEM controls source, tests, Platform/OTA/AVB keys and support recovery | realistic vendor remediation path | BEST PRODUCTION |
| C. Manufacturer signs a supplied patch/artifact | could enable /data/app APK if OEM accepts code review and exact build inputs |
possible organizationally; no service known | GOOD, requires OEM |
| D. Official firmware already includes fix | avoids third-party modification entirely | no newer verified package inspected | GOOD, verify release |
| E. Local signing | arbitrary new key is rejected by shared UID/PackageManager/AVB | cryptographically incompatible | NO-GO |
Keys are separate
- APK Platform signer: SHA-256
D8:FF:E0:AF:...:90:68. - OTA/recovery certificate: SHA-256
E0:18:AB:2F:...:A0:F8. - AVB root/public-key identity: unread/unknown.
- Payload signing key: unknown until an official
.upgis analyzed.
One key does not substitute for another. Even OEM-signed APKs do not authorize a modified system image, and an OTA certificate does not satisfy the APK shared-UID check.
Ethical/security boundary
No leaked keys, private-key extraction, forged certificate, PackageManager or recovery check patch, AVB disablement or signature-verification bypass is part of this plan. The only acceptable signing paths terminate in Philips/TPVision or another explicitly authorized owner of the device trust keys.