2.0 KiB
Phase 7J – Modified system image feasibility
REPACK POSSIBLE
The system partitions are fixed-size (~2,390 MiB) ext4 images in a static A/B, system-as-root layout. With a complete source/target-files package, a build pipeline could theoretically:
- stage the full root/system tree without mutating the baseline;
- integrate APK/JAR changes and compatible resources/manifests;
- regenerate ARM32 dexpreopt ODEX/VDEX and class-loader contexts;
- apply exact UID/GID/mode/capability metadata (
fs_config); - apply complete SELinux labels/xattrs and policy-compatible file contexts;
- create deterministic fixed-size ext4 images (sparse conversion only as a transport representation);
- regenerate dm-verity hashtree, FEC and AVB footer/descriptors;
- build/sign vbmeta and the Android A/B payload/container;
- validate inactive-slot install, boot, mark-successful and rollback.
This proves only that the format is technically buildable.
BOOTABLE/TRUSTED – current status
NO-GO. Missing inputs include:
- exact Philips build/target-files tree and proprietary integrations;
- private Platform signer or an OEM signing service for the APK targets;
- AVB signing keys/root-of-trust compatibility and rollback indexes;
- official OTA payload/container signing process;
- authoritative SELinux contexts, fs_config and dexpreopt configuration;
- exact firmware package and full recovery procedure;
- a lab device or proven A/B failure recovery drill.
The device is locked and green. A well-formed ext4 image is not accepted merely because it mounts offline. Reusing stock vbmeta after a content change fails verity; signing with an arbitrary AVB key fails the locked root of trust.
Why root is insufficient
Runtime root could mount or write files only by stepping outside the production trust model. It cannot create the OEM Platform/AVB signatures, make stale ART outputs coherent or guarantee cold-boot recovery. Persistent root/remount/ verification bypasses are outside authorization and are not deployment paths.